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nite conclusions may be drawn as a result of the decision in the principal
case. The first is that, where matters are contested in a special appear-
ance relating to jurisdiction, both of the person and of the subject mat-
ter,4 and the court makes a specific ruling on these matters, they become
res judicata for the purpose of future litigation in foreign courts. If this
first conclusion be sound, and the decision in the principal case is not
construed as having been founded on a general appearance of the de-
fendant spouse, then there has been a definite extension of the doctrine of
Haddock v. Haddock. That extension consists of permitting one spouse
to obtain a divorce in a state wherein the other is neither domiciled, resi-
denced, nor personally served, even though that state is not the matri-
monial domicile,4" if it be found that the plaintiff in such an action
established such a separate domicile as a result of the fault of the other;
and such a decree, when rendered, will be entitled to full faith and
credit. How this matter of fault will be determined seems to be an open
question. It is submitted that the only method by which it may be
finally adjudicated is by an appeal to the United States Supreme Court
in those instances in which a divorce is subsequently sought by the other
spouse at his or her domicile and in which the decree of the first court
i denied full faith and credit. Since such an appeal is not a question of
right,43 it may well be that the extension of the Haddock case will not
have great practical significance. The result may be, as indicated by
Professor Strahorn,44 that in the future the court will pick and choose
the cases by granting or denying certiorari.
CHARLES A. REYNARD.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FINALITY OF LEGISLATIVE RECORDS
On July 22, 1936, the General Assembly of the State of Ohio
voted to take a five minute recess and thereupon disbanded to their
respective homes. On December 8, 1936, the General Assembly con-
vened and adopted a motion that entries be made in the respective
journals of the House and the Senate to show the convening in session of
" In stating that the extension covers both jurisdiction of the person and subject
matter, it must be remembered that the court has only committed itself to this doctrine with
respect to actions for divorce, and may not hold to the same views in other types of actions.
See notes 9 and ga, supra.
"o The term "matrimonial domicile" is here used in the same sense as defined in
note 31, supra.
4 zS U.S.C.A. (Judicial Code) sec. 344; FOSTER, "FEDERAL PRACTICE," 6th ed., sec.
692c.
" Strahorn, supra, note 40.
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each house twice a week from July 22 until December 8, 1936. Such
entries were incorporated into the journals of the House and of the Sen-
ate, so that it would appear that 40 sessions of the Assembly had been
held when, in fact, no such sessions had occurred. Thereafter the
clerks of the respective Houses certified to the auditor of state the
members' allowance for mileage to and from said 40 purported sessions.
This involved $21,507 for the members of the House and $5,557 for
those of the Senate. Arnett Harbage, a taxpayer, brought suit against
the auditor of state, president of the senate, speaker of the house,
and the clerks of both Houses to enjoin the payment of said mileage
allowances to the House and to recover back those already paid to the
Senate. On the hearing for the permanent injunction, Judge Reynolds
of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas held for the plaintiff.
Harbage v. Tracy etal., 9 Ohio Ops. 276, 24 Ohio L.Ab. 553 (1937)-
General Code section 50 provides: " . . . Each member shall re-
ceive the legal rate of railroad transportation each way for mileage once
a week during the session from and to his place of residence, by the most
direct route of public travel to and from the seat of government, to be
paid at the end of each regular or special session."
General Code section 54 says: "The president of the senate and
the speaker of the house of representatives shall ascertain the number
of days' attendance of each member and officer of the respective houses
during the session, the number of miles of travel of each member to
and from the seat of government and certify such attendance and mile-
age, and the amount due therefor, to the auditor of state."
The defendants' first defense was weakly based on the foregoing
statutes, urging that they provided for the payment of the mileage allow-
ance for each week of the term of the assembly as part of the members'
compensation whether or not the body was in actual session. This belief
was professed in the face of two opinions of the attorney-general of
Ohio advising that the assembly must be "actually sitting and trans-
acting business" in order for the mileage allowances to be paid.' The
latter of these in 1934 was in answer to a direct inquiry on the subject
from the speaker of the house.2 Judge Reynolds held that, although
the statutes are compensatory in that the members are paid mileage each
week whether or not they go b~ck and forth, in order for the allowances
to accrue the assembly must actually be in session.
The defendants' principal defense, however, was reliance on a long
I 919 O.A.G., V. I, p. 587i 1934 O.A.G. z927.
a These opinions in no way considered the matter involved in these defendants'
principal defense since there had been no entries made in the journals as to non-existent
sessions.
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established doctrine of constitutional law-the official journals of the
legislature, as required to be kept by the Constitution, import absolute
verity and form conclusive proof of the proceedings themselves. Such
journals are not subject to judicial contradiction or attack, and the
recitals therein, when made by the authority of the legislature, are to
be taken as true and cannot be contradicted by other evidence. The
result of the application of this doctrine was, in the words of the court,
that the defendants tried to show that they "are entitled to compensa-
tion whether earned or not, and that the Legislature was in session even
though it was not."
The court disposed of this defense in the following words: "It is
well settled that the validity of any legislative enactment cannot be
questioned by attacking the correctness of the journal record of the pro-
ceedings of either branch of the legislative body. Here the question is
raised relative to a ministerial act. There is nothing sacred about such
acts, and no reason of public policy, such as that relating to legislative
acts, which would seem to inhibit an examination of the correctness of
such acts. Since the questioning of the journal records in no way reflects
upon legislative enactments but is confined purely to the ministerial acts
of certain oficers as provided by G.C. Sec. 54, the court holds that for
such purposes the records may be questioned, and if the duties prescribed
by statute have not been properly carried out, the true facts may be
shown."
The application of the doctrine of the finality of legislative records
to the facts of the principal case is novel and raises many interesting
questions as to the purpose, effect, and extent of the rule.
The background of the policy and purpose of the rule is the doctrine
-Separation of Powers. The court in Taylor v. Beckham3 declared:
"The ground of all the decisions is that the judiciary have no power to
sit in judgment upon the motives of an independent branch of the gov-
ernment, or to deny legal effect to the record of its action solemnly
made by it pursuant to the Constitution. If this were allowed, it would
soon follow that the independence of the Legislature would be destroyed
altogether." To dispute the verity of the senate journal would be to
violate both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution; to invade a
co-ordinate and independent department of the government, and to
interfere with the separate and legitimate power and functions of the
legislature.4 It is necessary that the will of the legislature shall not be
overturned and defeated and the rights of the people embarrassed every
a zoS Ky. 278, S6 S.W. 177, 2z Ky. L. 1735, 49 L.R.A. 258 (1900). Writ of
error dismissed-1 7S U.S. 548, 44 L.Ed. ix87 (1900).
' Wise v. Bigger, Clerk, 79 Va. 269 (1884).
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time a zealous litigant or a crackpot discovers a mere failure in legislative
procedure in fact although the journal of the body imports its occurrence.
In Fox v. Harris, where plaintiff sought to mandamus the clerks of
the senate and of the house to omit allegedly false material from the
records, it was held: "Courts have no power to interfere in any manner
with the proceedings of either of the legislative branches or with the
action of their respective clerks in making up the journals of their pro-
ceedings as long as they are acting in obedience to the will of those
bodies." In Re House of Representatives6 and McCullough v. The
State,' it was announced that the journals are conclusive evidence of the
facts which appear on their face and the power to determine the cor-
rectness of the journal is solely in the legislative body keeping it, which
is also the only tribunal by which it can be changed and corrected.
In Taylor v. Beckham,' the doctrine of the finality of legislative
records was applied where the validity of journal entries, as to the
presence of certain members during a vote in the hearing of a guber-
natorial election contest, was attacked on charges of fraud and con-
spiracy between clerks and members. The court was without jurisdic-
tion to go behind the record made by the legislature under the consti-
tution. Again the doctrine was conclusive in Auditor General v. The
Board of Supervisors9 in passing upon the question whether or not a
quorum was present when certain legislative action was taken. Parol
evidence was inadmissible to alter or contradict the journal. Tlie rule
was also final in the determination of the two-thirds vote required to
repass a vetoed bill in Wise v. Bigger, Clerk."
In State v. Dixie Finance" Co.," evidence contradicting the recitals
of the senate journal as to the date of the return of an unsigned bill by
the governor was excluded. The court in Amos v. Moseley12 applied
the doctrine as to the taking of yeas and nays and the counting of them.
So did the court in Earnest v. Sargent, Auditor3 as to whether or not
a bill passed before the expiration of the constitutional limitation on the
session length; and the date of adjournment as shown by the journal
is not contradicted or rendered uncertain by record evidence therein of
the transaction of a large amount of business within a short period of
time. 4
79 W. Va. 419, 91 S.E. 209 (1917).
45 R.I. 289, x2o Atl. 868 (1923).
7 x3 Ind. 424 (1858).
s See note 3, supra.
89 Mich. 552, 51 N.w. 483 (x8qx).
10 See note 4, sepra.
"2 i52 Tenn. 3o6, 278 S.W. 59 (z925).
12 74 Fla. 555, 77 So. 6xg, L.R.A. 19x8C482 (1917).
13 2o N.M. 427, So Pac. zoi8 (293S).
"' Capito v. Topping, 65 W.Va. 587, 64 S.E. 845, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) xo8g (xgog).
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State ex rel. Landis v. Thompson'5 furnishes a good example of a
court riding on a legal merry-go-round while applying the doctrine.
Here the legislature stopped the clocks and caused the journals to be
falsified by including bills passed within the next eight hours as having
been passed prior to noon, May 31, 1935. There was a 6o-day con-
stitutional limitation on the session length. After elaborate statement of
the rule as to conclusiveness of legislative records, the court held the
records could be impeached since the records were not directed to be
made by the legislature for it was constitutionally no longer a legislature
at the time the directions were made as it had exceeded its 6o-day life.
Since the latter fact could not be determined except by impeachment of
the journal records first, the inconsistency of this decision makes for
no valuable precedent.
"'Where the evidence furnished by the journals is ambiguous or
contradictory . . . , recourse may be had to other competent evidence
to show the actual facts." State ex rel. Crocker v. Junkin.6 Extrinsic
evidence was also admitted in State v. Mason " to show that, through
an improper exercise of judgment on the part of a public official or state
agent or representative, intrinsic error exists and that the journals have
not been made the actual repository of the proceedings of the assembly.
Although in uttering these words the court in that case was definitely
vague as to their meaning or scope, yet it is rather evident that they
were to be interpreted in the light of the facts-an unauthorized altera-
tion by the clerk. Otherwise the court "will not assume to contradict
or impeach the journal upon any charge of fraud or mistake; nor will
it pass upon a disputed question of fact as to what proceedings were
taken. m
In Milwaukee County v. Isenring, "9 it was held, "While such jour-
nals are controlling as regards to what the legislature does in respect to
the passage of a bill, they are not necessarily so as to the contents of a
statute. On the latter subject courts may look to the enrolled bill, and to
any other legitimate evidence within their reach." Although there are
very few cases directly dealing with this phase, most of the reported cases
(in states where the doctrine of the conclusiveness of enrolled bills is not
applied) make no'distinction between procedure and contents of statutes,
but lay down the broad rule as in In Re House of Representatives, supra,
"The journals are conclusive evidence of the facts which appear on their
face . . ." This would seem to better carry out the policy of the rule.
x zrxFla. 56i, 64 So. 19z.(1935;).
Is 79 Neb. 532, 113 N.W. 256 (1907).
17 43 La. Ann. 590, 9 So. 776 (1891).
's In Re Opinion of the Justices, supra, note 6.
19 zog Wis. 9, 85 N.W. 131, 53 L.R.A. 635 (1909).
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It is a controverted question as to how much effect the usual consti-
tutional provision for the keeping of the legislative journals has on the
application of the rule of finality of legislative records. Article II, Sec-
tion 9 of the Ohio Constitution provides: "Each house shall keep a cor-
rect journal of its proceedings, which shall be published." The state
constitutions often require certain enumerated steps to be taken and
entered in the journal, as the counting of yeas and nays, three readings
of a bill of appropriation or of a general character, etc. It was held in
Rash v. llen ° that where the constitution requires certain legislative
steps to be entered in the journals, then these journals are the best evi-
dence as to those steps and if not entered, they did not take place. The
usual rule, as stated in State v. Frank,2 is that where certain procedural
steps are not mentioned in the journal, they will be presumed to have
taken place. This presumption of the validity of legislative action exists
unless the journals definitely show the contrary.
A doctrine closely related to the rules of finality of legislative records
is that of the conclusiveness of enrolled bills prevalent in many states.
This doctrine does not pertain to legislative functions and duties as a
whole, but confines the inquisition as to the validity of statutes to the
enrolled bill.22 Jurisdictions following this doctrine feel that even the
legislative journals are too apt to be incorrect, and, pressed by the need
for the sanctity of statutes, exclude the journals (as well as any other
evidence) in determining the procedural constitutionality of such statutes.
The courts are limited to the evidence existing on the face of the enrolled
bill. A great number of states do not take this stand, and allow the courts
to go behind the enrolled bill and look at the journal records. Among
the latter is Ohio.23
Wilson v. Markley24 stated that since North Carolina had the doc-
trine of the conclusiveness of enrolled bills, the legislative journals were
competent evidence as to statutes only for the purpose of ascertaining
whether or not a law had been passed in accordance with Article II,
Section 14 of the constitution specifically requiring the entry of yeas and
o Boyce 444 (Del.), 76 At. 370 (191o).
-' 6o Neb. 3z7, 83 N.W. 74 (igoo). See, Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 475 (1854),
and Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio St. 276 (1856), holding certain constitutional requirements
directory and not mandatory, thus their absence from the journal record creating no inval-
idity.
2 See note 23 L.R.A. 34o; 4o L.R.A. (N.S.) i.
"State ex tel. Herron v. Smith, 44 Ohio St. 348, 7 N.E. 447, iz N.E. 8z9 (x886);
Ritzman v. Campbell, 93 Ohio St. 246, xz N.E: 59x, L.R.A. 19i6E, izas (x196);
Fordyce v. Godman, Atid., zo Ohio St. x (1870). For list of'states holding each way see
Ritzman v. Campbell, supra, p. 254. See i Cooley's CoNSsTurrTo NAL LMIMTATo Ns Z77,
n. z and 3.
24 133 N.C. 616, 45 S.E. 2oz3 (903); In accord: The People v. Leddy, 53 Colo.
109, 1Z3 Pac. 824 (1g9z).
nays on second and third readings of certain types of bills. Amos v.
Moseley2" likewise limits the competence of the journal records to those
entries specifically required to be kept by the constitution.
On the other hand, jurisdictions which do not follow the doctrine
of the conclusiveness of enrolled bills do not distinguish between the
entries specifically required by the constitution and any other entries or
facts placed in the journal. Nor does the usual constitutional provision
for the keeping of a legislative journal per se create the finality of the
records, nor does it per se limit the available evidence of the true facts to
the journal. Rather, the courts which quote such provisions seem to do
so merely for the purpose of establishing the legislative journal as an
official record in contrast to the ancient English concept of the legislative
journal-not an official record, but a mere "remembrance of the pro-
ceedings." In Rohrbacher v. Mayor of JacksonF26 it was held that
legislative journals are not records importing absolute verity unless made
to do so by constitutional or statutory provisions, which had not been
done in that state at that time. The court followed the old English idea
of such journals not being official records. Article IV, Section 55 of the
present constitution of Mississippi now provides that a legislative journal
will be kept, the proceedings will be published, and yeas and nays will
be entered.
Outside of the official status conferred by the constitutions, the true
force behind the doctrine of the conclusiveness of legislative journals
seems to be imbedded in public policy. "The resultant evil (curtailment
of the governor's time to consider a bill) might be slight as compared
with that of altering the probative force and character of legislative
records and making the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain
oral evidence. Long, long centuries ago, these considerations of public
policy led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability
to legislative records. This has become a rule of evidence." So says the
West Virginia court in Capito v. Toping.
2 1
The Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. Herron v. Smith26 said:
"Imperative reasons of public policy require that the authenticity of laws
should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent character.
They should be public, because all are required to conform to them;
they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of
what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, by
facts resting only in the memory of individuals."
74 Fla. 55, 77 So. 6xg, L.R.A. x918C 482 (1917).
21 5 Miss. 73S (x87).
27 See note 14, supra.
2-a See note z3, supra.
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From the court in White v. Hinton" came, "On these records
reliance is had by the bench, the bar, and the public, of necessity and
right. Resort cannot be had to the recollection of individuals to show
what the law is or is not. The evil would be much less than the unset-
tling of the evidentiary foundation of all statutory law, and the weak-
ening of the public faith in all existing legislative enactments, which
would result from throwing open the records of legislative action to
impeachment by parol testimony whenever the interest or caprice of
individuals may prompt them to such a course."'3
In Morgan v. Buffington,"' the court announced that the mileage
certificate signed by the speaker of the house was not conclusive upon
the auditor and that he could inquire into the truth of the facts, or con-
test the legality of the conclusions stated in the certificate. However, the
court neither stated nor intimated that the auditor could go behind the
legislative journals as to the truth of such facts.
The doctrine of the conclusiveness of the journal was accepted in
5 Ohio 358 by our Supreme Court in State v. Moffitt (1832). There
the senate journal showed that Lemuel Moffitt had been elected as a
judge, while the house journal stated Samuel Moffitt had been elected.
When it was attempted to show "Samuel" was a mistake and both
houses had meant to elect Lemuel, the court excluded such evidence and
stated that the journal recital was final and could not be impeached.
The general doctrine that the journal imports absolute verity and that
the court will judicially notice said journal was accepted and set out in
State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, supra, where there was a question of
seating members without the necessary quorum whereafter said members
then voted to pass the bill presently challenged.
In Harbage v. Tracy, et al., supra, Judge Reynolds had a fact set-up
where the use of the apparently applicable rule of finality of legislative
records would have had a distasteful and unjustifiable result. "While
there is much abuse of the privilege and position of public office, we still
cling to the ideal, at least, that a public office is a public trust, and it
should be so regarded, . . ." The court further portrayed his conster-
nation over such a result by saying, "Public policy surely requires that
there be some method of attacking the records if and when those records
work to the detriment of the public weal."
The court's striving for a just result, added to the absence of
decisions dealing with the present, or a similar, fact situation, led Judge
Reynolds to avoid the application of the doctrine by finding that the
':3 Wyo. 73, 30 Pac. 953, I7 L.R.A. 66 (x89z).
ao See 22 C.J., Evidence, secs. 1421 to 3427.
al Z Mo. 549 (855).
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"questioning of the journal records in no way reflects on legislative
enactments but is confined purely to the ministerial acts of certain offi-
cers," and that the doctrine does not apply to ministerial acts.
While the result of the court's decision is commendable, the basis
of the decision is open to criticism. In avoiding the application of the
rule,32 the court resorted to a play on words. There is no magic about
the word, "ministerial." An official action is ministerial when it is abso-
lute, certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a set
task, and when the law which imposes it prescribes the time, manner,
and occasion of its performance with such certainty that nothing remains
for judgment or discretion.33 Such a definition fits many or most of the
duties of the state officers enforcing and executing the laws and statutes
of the state. If Judge Reynolds's reasoning were sound, a litigant could,
by enjoining or mandamusing the ministerial officer, go back of the
legislative journals for the true facts relating to the law the officer is
enforcing, and thus defeat and overturn the will of the legislature and
embarrass the rights of the people every time he discovered a mere failure
of legislative procedure. Adoption of the "ministerial" reasoning would
but violate the doctrine of the separation of powers and would destroy
the public policy which the rule of the finality of legislative records effects.
After extensive search, the writer regrets the inability to find case
records dealing with a fact situation comparable to the one here involved.,
or any cases approximating the conclusion which is about to be reached.
So without precedent to forbid it or to support it, a theory is advanced.
It seems probable that Judge Reynolds was possessed of the same theory,
but used an unfortunate choice of language in its presentation.
The result reached in Harbage v. Tracy can be approached on
another tack. The purpose of the present rule is to preserve the inde-
pendence of the legislature and to protect the public by stabilizing its
rights by thwarting attempts to defeat legislative enactments and func-
tions on the discovery of mere procedural error on the part of the legis-
lative body. Many are the decisions setting out these dual policies pro-
moted by the doctrine of finality of legislative records--separation of
powers and avoidance of confusion of the laws. The rule has usually
been applied without limitations in those states declining the doctrine of
enrolled bills. But in each of these cases the courts were confronted by
an attempt to question the recitals of the journals in reference to the
validity of an actual statute or legislative duty which was part of the
' For the application of the rule to local legislative records, see 98 A.L.R. 1229
(x935); 13 Ohio St. 406 (s86z); (records of county commissioners). For the application
of a like rule to executive records, see 3 O.S.L.J. z59, z77 (1937).33 z Words and Phrases (4 th Series) 689.
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inviolate function of the legislature and which affected the right or duties
of the citizens of the state. They pronounced the rule with that in mind.
Such application was carrying out the purpose and policy of the rule.
In the Harbage case, no such situation prevails. Impeachment of
the journals will not interfere with the legislature in its official duties nor
will it confuse the rights of the public. In applying the doctrine to the
present facts certain questions should be asked. Does the legislature's
appropriation of unearned mileage allowance to itself constitute a situa-
tion similar to the decided cases? Will the questioning of the journal
records in this case violate the separation of powers? Does it upset the
rights and duties of the people by disclosing a mere procedural defect?
These questions must be answered in the negative. Every rule of law
should have a reason and a purpose and these should be kept in mind.
Otherwise, by blind application, the court becomes a legal mechanic and
not a referee dispensing justice. Allowance of parol testimony to show
the actual facts here will not violate either of the policies giving rhyme
and reason to the rule.
Here is a case which falls without the rule and the latter should not
be mouthed by courts divorced from the purpose and policy which created
it. Here is not a respected and impeccable legislative action, but here is
merely a legislative "steal"--a recompense for doing nothing.
At this writing, Harbage v. Tracy is still in the throes of controversy
in the court of common pleas, but if the case be appealed, it will be hoped
the superior courts will abstain from a mechanical adherence to a rule
which has no relation to the facts at hand.
JAMES M. GORMAN
EQUITY
THE FusION OF LAW AND EouiTY - VENDOR AND PURCHASER
The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently considered the question
whether a vendor in an executory contract of sale containing dependent
covenants may, after tender of deed and deposit thereof in court, main-
tain an action at law on such executory contract for the unpaid purchase
price. The court repudiated the holdin gof the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth District1 on this point of law, although it affirmed the decision
because the tender was not good in fact.2
The two traditional remedies available to the vendor, upon default
'Fairlawn Heights Co. v. Theis, z7 Ohio L. Abs. ig (1938).
2 Fairlawn Heights Co. v. Theis, 133 Ohio St. 387, 14 N.E. (zd) x (x938).
2.22
